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CRIMINAL LAW
CRIMINAL LAW: INDIGENT DEFENDANT'S RIGHT
TO INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIST
In United States v. Schultz' the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that a federal bank robbery defendant,
whose mental capacity to commit the crime was in consider-
able doubt, was entitled to an independent psychiatrist at
government expense. This decision was based on interpreta-
tion of the discretion that lower courts have, in granting ex-
pert assistance such as psychiatrists to defendants who can-
not afford one, under Section 3006A(e) of the Criminal Jus-
tice Act of 1964.2 The court held that, "the courts ought to
apply a more lenient standard in determining the need for
services of experts in preparation for trial," and lack of such
assistance in this case resulted in prejudice to the defendant8
Ever since the landmark decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illinois,4 on the issue of the con-
stitutional rights of the indigent 5 accused in criminal prose-
cutions, there have been questions as to the extent of aid
that the state and federal courts must provide to such de-
fendants.8
1 United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1970).
2 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (e) (1964). The Act was amended on Oct.
14, 1970, but the changes do not affect the subject matter of
this note.
8 431 F.2d at 910.
4 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
5 For purposes of this comment indigent is to include not only
those individuals completely without funds to prepare their
defense, but also those who may have sufficient funds to pay
their counsel, but lack the additional funds for the psy-
chiatrist.
6 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), right to counsel
in felony cases; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963),
right to counsel on appeal; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235
(1970), right not to be subject to imprisonment beyond the
maximum statutory period for involuntary nonpayment of
a fine or court costs.
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Congress, recognizing the needs and public policies for
equalizing the scales of justice with respect to those who can-
not financially sustain an effective defense, enacted the Crimi-
nal Justice Act of 19647 providing therein for counsel and
other aid to all defendants in federal courts. Shortly there-
after a number of states followed, enacting similar statutes
applicable to their state courts.8 Section 3006A(e) provides for
the assistance of investigative, expert or other services, which
includes the services of a psychiatrist where there is reason-
able ground to establish an insanity defense.9
Considering the special nature of the insanity defense or
the defense of partial responsibility, 0 in most jurisdictions
the need for the assistance of an independent psychiatrist is
mandatory to an effective defense. In our adversary system
of criminal proceedings, the truth is best realized when the
opposing sides are approximately equal in the facilities avail-
able to them in preparation and at trial." Lacking the assis-
tance of an independent psychiatrist where the defense of in-
sanity is interposed, the defendant is so bereft of that equality
in preparation and at trial, whether in a federal or state court,
as to have his case prejudiced as in SchultZ.12
7 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
8 See Lewin, Indigency-Informal and Formal Procedures to
Provide Partisan Psychiatric Assistance to the Poor, 52 IowA
L. REV. 458, 479-80 (1966).
9 Infra note 82.
10 For a discussion of the doctrine of partial responsibility,
see Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting
The Degree of a Crime, 56 YALE L. J. 959, 964 (1947). For
a summary of the jurisdictions accepting the doctrine see
Lewin, Mental Disorder and the Federal Indigent, 11 S.
DAK. L. REV. 198, 251 (1966).
11 United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107, 115 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957). Finnegan, J. dissenting: "[I]f
society desires that courts engage in a search for truth,
before punishing, then I would avoid being stingy with
defense materials."
12 431 F.2d 907.
[Vol. 7, No. 2
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CRIMINAL LAW
It is the contention of this comment that the indigent
accused is now entitled to independent psychiatric help at
government expense, even absent a statute, on constitutional
grounds. Eighteen years ago the Supreme Court held that a
state did not have a duty to provide the indigent defendant
with an independent psychiatrist.13 There has been no hold-
ing on this issue since the Griffin decision although a more
recent case,14 remanded on other grounds, argued that such a
denial is a violation of both the sixth amendment right to
counsel, and the fourteenth amendment equal protection and
due process guarantees. As the procedural requirements of
defense of insanity or a defense under the doctrine of partial
responsibility make the need for psychiatric assistance ever
more mandatory to the preparation of an effective defense,
a holding that such aid is constitutionally required should not
be a surprise. In the words of the then Circuit Judge, now
Chief Justice Burger, "I do not think the law grows by some
sudden discovery. I think it unfolds. We find defects and we
remedy defects and when we find that is not adequate we
take another step."' 5
THE SPEcIAL NATURE OF THE INSANITY PROCEEDING
There are definite public policy reasons to provide parti-
san psychiatric aid to those indigent criminal accused, who
have a reasonable claim to an insanity defense. These reasons
are the desire to use the best methods available to ascertain
the truth and preserve the respect of judicial proceedings as
well as the public interest in minimizing the cost of such
proceedings.1
13 United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
1- Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586 (1963).
'r Proceedings of the Annual Judicial Conference of the 10th
Judicial Circuit of the United States 32 F.R.D. 481, 561
(1962).
1o See note 19 infra.
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It is interesting to note that the majority of the arguments
raised opposing the providing of partisan psychiatrists at state
expense to indigent accused are based on the high costs that
thereby would be incurred by the state.17 The fear is that not
only will every defendant plead a need for psychiatric help,
but the defendants that show such need will exhaust state
resources in "fishing expeditions" looking for the particular
psychiatrist who will best present their individual cases.
Even assuming readily available government paid psychia-
tric aid, every defendant would not seek to interpose the de-
fense of insanity. There exists a very practical restriction to
such pleas, for under present laws an insanity plea, ff suc-
cessful, may be the worse alternative.18 In those cases where
counsel for the indigent decides that a defense plea of insanity
is warranted, the cost to the state of providing psychiatric
assistance at the initial trial will probably be less than the
cost of subsequent appeals attacking the denial of such as-
sistance.19 The Federal experience under the Criminal Justice
Act shows that such expenses are not at all unreasonable. The
total expenditure for all subsection (e) services, in all fed-
eral district courts, for the first two years of operation was
only $88,000. This represented only about 1% of the cases in
which counsel was appointed under the Criminal Justice Act.20
Furthermore, subsection (e) covers all expert assistance, not
just that of psychiatrists.
The insanity defense is based on the principle that one
of the elements of the crime, intent, is lacking. In order to
17 Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent
Criminal Defendants, 47 MrN_ . L. REv. 1054, 1076 (1963).
18 Strickman, The Insanity Defense in Massachusetts: Some
Unresolved Problems, 53 MAss. L.Q. 195 (1968).
19 See, e.g., Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586 (1963), where after
appeal to the Supreme Court the state won a remand of
the case after promising to provide a psychiatrist.
20 Christian v. United States, 398 F.2d 517, 518 (1968), n. 2
citing Oaks, The Criminal Justice Act in the Federal Dis-
trict Courts, VIII 20 through 68.
[V"ol. 7, No. 2
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 7 [1971], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol7/iss2/4
CRIMINAL LAW
punish someone for a criminal adt the state must first prove
that the accused committed each and every. element of the
crime. If the accused can show that he was mentally incap-
able of acting wilfully so as to comply with the intent ele-
ment necessary to commit the crime he is not guilty.21 Such
an individual is in the same position as an infant who com-
mits an illegal act and neither is. criminally - responsible.22
Although the legal standard of what constitutes insanity
varies in different states and among the federal districts2 3
every jurisdiction recognizes the psychiatrist as an expert in
such matters and provides him with the testimonial advant-
age of presenting his opinions. Thus, whenever the defendant
wants to introduce the defense of insanity, no matter .what
the standard in his jurisdiction, he needs the expert assistance
of a psychiatrist.24
A number of states have attempted to resolve the dilemma
of the indigent defendant seeking psychiatric help by pro-
viding him with access to a court 'appointed psychiairist.25
The reasoning isually given is that this will prevent a battle
of experts. The court appointed psychiatrist or a government
mental hospital which may be used to answer the question of
21 For a general discussion of the desirability of allowing an
insanity defense see Comment, Mental -Illness and Criminal
Responsibility, 5 TULSA L.J. 171 (1968). See also, Waelder,
Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 378 (1952).
22 State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 402 (1869).
2 Burger, Psychiatrist, Lawyers, and the Courts 28 FED. PRo.-
BATION 1 (1964). Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Ill-
ness 21 Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1960).
24 See, e.g., Ramer v. United States, 390 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968).
25 For a general discussion of available state psychiatric aid
see Goldstein and Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psy-
chiatrist, and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1061
(1962).
19711 .
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defendant's insanity does not satisfy either the constitutional
requirements or the requirements for an adversary proceed-
ing.26 Where the court orders an insanity examination of the
defendant, it has been said that, "[t]he use of psychiatrists
as agents of the court at the pretrial stage has the effect of
giving defendants a psychiatric rather than a judicial trial"2 T
Even where such court appointed psychiatrists appear in court,
"[t]oo many writers and even some courts have been guilty
of assuming that the function of a psychiatric expert called
in connection with a defense of insanity 'is to aid the court
to reach a proper decision rather than to aid an indigent de-
fendant to prepare his case'."28
There is yet another reason for the inadequacy of im-
partial psychiatric aid. Should such court appointed neutral
psychiatrist testify against the defendant, the lack of a parti-
san defense psychiatrist denies defense counsel the requisite
knowledge to prepare an effective cross examination.29
Even in those states where the defendant is granted ac-
cess to psychiatric assistance other than the impartial expert,
such state aid provisions as exist, vary considerably in their
effectiveness. In some of the states the qualifications of the
examiners is questionable, 0 while in other states, although
2 Lewin, Indigency-Informal and Formal Procedures to Pro-
vide Partisan Psychiatric Assistance to the Poor, 52 IowA
L. REv. 458, 466-7 (1966).
27 Vann, An Analysis of the Use of Psychiatric Information
in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 43 U. DET. L.
REv. 13, 32 (1965).
28 Lewin, Mental Disorder and the Federal Indigent, 11 S. DAR.
L. REv. 198, 201 (1966).
29 For a general discussion of the impartial expert rule see
Orfield, Expert Witnesses in Federal Criminal Procedure,
20 F.R.D. 317, 346 (1957).
80 Krupnick v. United States, 264 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1959);
Roach v. State, 221 Ga. 783, 147 S.E.2d 299, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 935 (1966); State v. Jones, 201 S.C. 403, 23 S.E.2d
387 (1942).
[Vol. 7, No, 2
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the examiners are themselves qualified psychiatrists, their op-
portunity to examine the defendant is so limited as to be in-
effective.
Under the common law the person accused of criminal
conduct could absolve himself of responsibility for such con-
duct by showing insanity. The issue of insanity and thus the
culpability for the crime was a factual issue to be decided by
the jury. There was no separate test of what constituted in-
sanity. Reformers, beginning in the nineteenth century and
continuing to the present, have considered it unduly harsh to
allow lay jurors to decide issues of mental responsibility.
Rules were promulgated which established as a matter of law
the conditions necessary for absolving a defendant f r o m
criminal responsibility on the grounds of insanity. The juries
were left only with the decision as to whether the defendant
was or was not incapable of formulating that amount of in-
tent, at the time the act was committed, so as to make him
criminally culpable under whatever test is used in that juris-
diction. When a defendant's mental condition must be shown
to meet certain predetermined standards as a matter of law
in order to excuse him from criminal responsibility, then we
have in effect forced him to depend on psychiatrists to carry
his argument. It is not the purpose of this comment to dis-
cuss the validity of the various tests for insanity, nor the is-
sue of whether certain individuals should be absolved of
criminal responsibility for their anti-social conduct; but rath-
er, we limit ourselves to the narrow issue that once the privi-
lege of an insanity defense is recognized as available to the
defendant, it is the state's duty on constitutional grounds to
provide the indigent defendant with independent psychiatric
help. It is the very nature of the insanity defense that makes
the need for partisan psychiatric aid such a vital prerequisite
to the conduct of an effective defense.
19711
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, JUDIcIAL RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR GoVERNMENT PAID.
PsYcHIATIc ASSISTANCE TO THE INDIGENT CRIvmAL DEFENDANT
The plight of the indigent criminal defendant has been
recognized in numerous decisions,31 although none has speci-
fically decided what is the duty that the states owe to such
a defendant when a defense of insanity requires the aid of a
psychiatrist. Since the decision in United States ex rel. Smith
v. Baldi,32 where the Supreme Court held that there is no
constitutional duty to provide an indigent defendant with
partisan psychiatric aid when he has already received expert
assistance from a court appointed impartial psychiatrist, 8
there have been a number of strong dissents and lower court
decisions which argue that partisan psychiatric aid may in-
deed be constitutionally required.8
4
The constitutional arguments advanced in favor of such
assistance are based on the equal protection and due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment and on the right to
be represented by counsel of the sixth amendment. Since the
decision in Baldi, there has been a considerable expansion of
what constitutes "fundamental fairness" and of the rights that
states are constitutionally required to provide to the criminal
defendant.
81 Supra note 6.
82 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
88 Id. at 568, Petitioner further asserts that he should have
been given technical pretrial assistance by the
State. Although the trial judge testified that de-
fense counsel made no such request, petitioner here
states that the trial court refused to appoint a psy-
chiatrist to make a pretrial examination. We can-
not say that the State has that duty by constitu-
tional mandate.
814 See, e.g. dissent in United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,
192 F.2d 540 (3rd Cir. 1951), affd. 344 U.S. 561 (1953); dis-
sent in United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 567 (2nd Cir.
1956), vacated, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
[Vol. 7, No. 2
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Equal Protection Argument
The Supreme Court considered this clause in its decision
in Griffin v. Illinois,3 5 where it held that the denial of an ap-
peal to an indigent defendant, when that right is conditioned
upon the purchase of a required trial court transcript, was
a violation of the constitutional guarantee of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court there said, "[t]here can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has."36 The Court did not hold that the
right of appeal itself is within the constitutionally protected
guarantees, but that where a state creates such a right of
appeal, it must make it accessible to both the affluent and the
indigent.
The conventional limitations-that the discrimina-
tion must, to offend, be either intentionally discrim-
inatory in purpose or else arbitrary in effect-do not
apply where the discrimination results in something
that shocks the fundamental sense of justice. 7
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Griffin doctrine when
in Burns v. Ohio3s they held that the denial to the indigent
of a petition for leave to appeal for lack of a filing fee vio-
lated the equal protection clause. "The imposition by the
State of financial barriers restricting the availability of ap-
pellate review for indigent criminal defendants has no place
in our heritage of Equal Justice Under Law."39 A similar
result was reached by the Court where a petitioner was
required to pay a filing fee for a writ of habeas corpus. Mr.
Justice Clark there said, "the Fourteenth Amendment weighs
31 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
36 Id. at 19 (opinion of Black, J.)
37 Willcox and Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORN EL LAW Q. 1, 15 (1957)
(footnotes omitted).
88 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
8) Id. at 258.
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the interest of rich and poor criminals in equal scale, and
its hand extends as far to each. '40
In Douglas v. California,41 where the indigent defendant
was required to perfect his appeal by himself, the Court again
held that such distinctions between rich and poor are a
violation of the equal protection clause.
There is lacking that equality demanded by the
Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man .
enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the
record, research of the law, and marshalling of argu-
ments on his behalf, while the indigent ... is forced
to shift for himself.42
The Griffin-Douglas doctrine does not place a duty on
the state to provide every indigent defendant with unlimited
resources in preparing a defense. It merely puts on the state
an affirmative duty to provide such a defendant with that
amount of assistance which will assure essential fairness.43
Thus, where a state provides for the insanity defense, it
must similarly make it accessible to all. Furthermore, since
the implementation of an insanity defense requires the as-
sistance of a psychiatrist,44 it then follows that for indigent
defendants the state has a duty to provide such assistance
at its expense under the Griffin doctrine. In the words of
the late Judge Frank,
... [A] man may be jailed for life, or even electro-
cuted, because he hasn't the money to discover a miss-
ing document necessary to win his case or to employ a
competent hand-writing expert or psychiatrist. This
is not democratic justice. It makes a farce of, 'equality
40 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 714 (1961).
41 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
42 Id. at 357-58.
43 Id. at 357.
44 To do otherwise would be to deny the defendant funda-
mental fairness. Infra note 57.
[Vol. 7, No. 2
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before the law,' one of the first principles of a de-
mocracy.4 5
The opposing argument that providing psychiatric as-
sistance will place additional burdens on the states so as
to strain their orderly procedures was answered by Mr. Chief
Justice Burger when, in Williams v. Illinois46 the Court held
that the equal protection clause bars the states from imposing
a sentence greater than the statutory maximum against a de-
fendant who is financially unable to pay a fine.
We are not unaware that today's holding may place a
further burden on States in administering criminal
justice. Perhaps a fairer and more accurate statement
would be that new cases expose old infirmities which
apathy or absence of challenge had permitted to stand.
But the constitutional imperatives of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause must have priority over the comfortable
convenience of the status quo.4 7
Due Process Argument
The courts have not considered denial of partisan psychi-
atric assistance to an indigent defendant by the state to be
violative of the due process guarantee of the fourteenth
amendment. In McGarty v. O'Brien48 the First Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the availability of reports furnished by
doctors at the state Department of Mental Health was suf-
ficient to satisfy constitutional requirements. The court never-
theless, recognizing the disadvantage of the indigent, said:
45 15 F.R.D. 93, 101 (1954).
46 399 U.S. 235 (1970). For an argument to limit the duties
of the states to provide assistance to the indigent see the
dissent of Justice Harlan in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 360 (1963).
47 Id. at 245.
48 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928.
1971]
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How far the state, having the obligation to afford
to the accused a fair trial, a fair opportunity to make
his defense, is required under the due process clause
to minimize this disadvantage is a matter which, in
other contexts, may deserve serious examination.40
What is required under the concept of due process is
dependent on the time and the place of the proceedings, and
the accepted practices of the jurisdiction.50 "Concepts of
due process change and as civilization progresses our ideas
of fundamental fairness necessarily enlarge themselves."51
What the present day requirements of due process are is
to be determined on the basis of fundamental fairness.02
If the right to appeal is of such import as to bring it
within the due process fairness test, then certainly the dis-
advantages faced by the indigent defendant in preparing a
defense at the original trial is of equal merit. 3
In United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,64 although a
majority of four justices did not consider that due process
required the state to furnish a partisan psychiatrist for the
defendant, 5 three of the justices did so conclude in their
41 Id. at 155.
60 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70
HAnv. L. REV. 1 (1956).
5I United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 560 (3rd
Cir. 1951), Biggs, C.J. dissenting.52 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353, (1963); see also Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952).
0 Supra note 37.
54 192 F.2d 540 (3rd Cir, 1951).
15 Id. at 547. "... [W]e have great difficulty in accepting as
a proposition of constitutional law that one accused of
crime is entitled to receive at public expense all the col-
lateral assistance needed to make his defense .... We do
not think the requirements of due process go so far."
(Vol. 7, No. 2
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dissent. In the twenty years since this case was decided a
number of lower court decisions have indicated a change
in our concept of due process. The trial court in United States
v. Brodson5 6 held that the combined constitutional guarantees
of due process and right to counsel required that the indigent
defendant be furnished with the expert assistance of an ac-
countant in a tax case. In 1964 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas held the denial of
psychiatric aid to an indigent was a violation of due process,
citing the fundamental fairness doctrine.
In order for Bush in the instant case to have the
effective aid of counsel, it was necessary for his
counsel to have the assistance of a qualified psychia-
trist and a trial, without expert evidence as to sanity,
which found him sane and resulted in a life sentence
is so lacking in fairness as to be a denial of liberty
without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment. 57
Thus, to satisfy the requirement of due process, merely
furnishing the indigent defendant with counsel when he also
needs the service of a partisan phychiatrist is not enough.58
The Right to Counsel Argument
As long ago as 1932 the Supreme Court in Powell v.
Alabama"9 held that the sixth amendment right to counsel
means the right to an effective counsel.
[I]t is the duty of the court, whether requested
or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary re-
56 136 F.Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1955), rev'd. on other grounds,
241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911.
57 Bush v. McCollum, 231 F.Supp. 560, 565 (N.D. Tex. 1964),
aff'd. per curiam, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965).
58 "The appointment of counsel for a deaf mute would not
constitute due process of law unless an interpreter also was
available" dissent in United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,
192 F.2d 540, 559 (3rd Cir. 1951).
69 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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quisite of due process of law; and that duty is not
discharged by an assignment at such a time or under
such circumstances as to preclude the giving of ef-
fective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.00
Although the right to the assistance of effective counsel
in Powell was limited to indigent defendants in capital cases,
this ruling was extended to all federal felony prosecutions
in the case of Johnson v. Zerbst 61 and applied to the states
in Gideon v. Wainwright.0
The effective assistance of counsel has been considered
from both the opportunity that counsel has to prepare a
defense and his competence in implementing his assigned
duty. Courts have been reluctant to rule on the qualitative
performance of counsel, but where there has been a denial
of opportunity in terms of both time and access to the
defendant, the courts have generally held such to be a denial
of constitutional guarantees.0
In those special situations where it Is reasonable to in-
terpose a defense of insanity, or where the doctrine of partial
responsibility may be applicable, the lack of a psychiatrist
to the defense would so limit the preparation of the defense
as to constitute a denial of opportunity to prepare and thus
0 Id. at 71.
61 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
02 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6 E.g. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); "But the
denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to
consult with the accused and to prepare his defense, could
convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing
more than a formal compliance with the Constitution's
requirement that an accused be given the assistance of
counsel." See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the
Indigent Defendant, 78 HAiv. L. REv. 1434 (1965).
04 Brown v. Beto, 377 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1967); Thomas v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 90 F.2d 424, (D.C. Cir. 1937); King v. Beto,
305 F. Supp. 636 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff ', per curiam, 429
F.2d 221 (1970).
[Vol. 7, No. 2
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 7 [1971], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol7/iss2/4
CRIMINAL LAW
be in violation of the constitutional right to counsel. 65 The
issue the courts must decide is whether the defendant can
present a meaningful defense without the aid requested. 6
This was the reasoning of the early cases 67 and it ought to
apply to the issue of psychiatric assistance. If the lack of a
psychiatrist of his own choice 8 prevents the defendant from
obtaining a meaningful defense, then the presence of counsel
is not enough.
Before the passage of the Criminal Justice Act, 9 a fed-
eral district court in the case of United States v. Germany7 0
5 Bush v. McCollum, 231 F.Supp. 560, 564 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
Denial of motions of Bush's counsel prior to
trial to commit him to a mental hospital for ex-
amination or provide funds for employment of a
qualified psychiatrist or otherwise make available
to the jury and to court appointed counsel psy-
chiatric evidence as to Bush's sanity deprived him
of the only satisfactory procedure for determining
sanity.
By overruling Bush's motions and failing to
provide him an opportunity to prepare his defense,
the State denied him a fair trial as required by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
60 Id. at 565, "[T]he right to counsel is meaningless if the
lawyer is unable to make an effective defense because he
has no funds to provide the specialized testimony which
the case requires."
67 In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58-59 (1932) the Court
held that the right to counsel includes competent counsel,
time and opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. See
also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967) where
the Court held: "The plain wording of this guarantee thus
encompasses counsel's assistance whenever necessary to as-
sure a meaningful 'defence'."
08 In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) the
Supreme Court held that the right to assistance of coun-
sel includes the right to counsel of defendant's choice.
69 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
7o 32 F.R.D. 343 (M.D. Ala. 1963). But see, United States v.
Bows, 360 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 961,
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held that denial to an appointed attorney of extra funds to
enable him to interview the material witness, and to view
the scene of the alleged crime was such a limitation as to
deny the indigent defendant his constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel.71
The special nature of the defenses of insanity and dimin-
ished responsibility is such as to make the assistance of a
psychiatrist concommitant with the requirement for the effec.
tive aid of counsel. The New Jersey court in State v. Rush
said,
The obligation of the State to provide the indigent
with the means for an appropriate defense rises
from an interplay of the constitutional rights to
counsel, to a fair trial, and to equality before the law.7 2
where court upheld denial of trip expenses to privately
retained counsel of indigent defendant for failure to show
that such aid was required to obtain effective assistance
of counsel.
7 32 F.R.D. at 344,
There is no question but that the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, in pro-
viding that, '[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall * * * have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense,' requires that the assistance of counsel
be more than a mere formal appointment or an
empty gesture. Powell v. Alabama, Johnson v.
Zerbst, Avery v. Alabama. These cases that re-
quire not only the formal appointment of counsel,
but the appointment of competent counsel, effec-
tive counsel, and counsel that have, 'an opportunity'
and 'time' to prepare and present their indigent
clients' cases, have been recognized time and again
by the Supreme Court of the United States and
the various circuit courts of appeal. See Johnson
v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957) and Mitchell
v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 850, wherein numerous cases from
the various courts of appeal are referred to, con-
struing the question of what constitutes effective
assistance of counsel.
72 46 N.J. 399, 416, 217 A.2d 441, 450 (1966).
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LEGISLATIVE REcoGNITIoN
The state of New Jersey, in 1795, enacted what is probably
the very first statute providing for the assistance of counsel
to the indigent.73 "The court before whom any person shall
be tried upon indictment, is hereby authorized and required
to assign to such person, if not of ability to procure counsel,
such counsel, not exceeding two, as he or she shall desire
That such assistance should include psychiatric assistance
to the indigent defendant in murder prosecutions was decided
in State v. Horton.T This concept was subsequently reaffirm-
ed in non-murder cases 7
Other states have followed with a variety of measures
to provide necessary assistance to the indigent accused inter-
posing a defense of insanity.77 These provisions have, for the
most part, consisted of mental examinations by a state mental
facility or by a psychiatrist appointed by the court s
7, Trebach, The Indigent Defendant, 11 RumsiFS L. REv. 625,
629 (1957).
74 PmENmGTOK, LAws OF TE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 1703-1820
p. 184 (1820).
75 34 N.J. 518, 170 A.2d 1,9 (1961), "The constitutional obliga-
tion to furnish counsel to an indigent can sensibly only be
construed to include as well that which is necessary to
proper defense in addition to the time and professional
efforts of an attorney and we have no doubt of the inherent
power of a court to require such to be provided at public
expense."
76 State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
77 Goldstein and Fine, The Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist,
and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1061, 1092
(1962); WEmoFE-, MENTAL DISoRDER As A CmnnuAL DE-
FENSE (1954).
79 Lewin, Indigency-Informal and Formal Procedures to Pro-
vide Partisan Psychiatric Assistance to the Poor, 52 IowA
L. REv. 458, 472-87 (1966).
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Through the years the United States Congress also has
enacted legislation providing some assistance to the indigent
accused pleading insanity in federal courts.7 9 These provisions
were not considered adequate,8 0 resulting in the passage of
the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.81 This law provides for the
appointment at government expense of psychiatrists to aid
the defendant in his defense upon a showing in an ex parte
proceeding that an expert is required.8 2
This new Federal Law did not limit aid to the absolutely
indigent criminal defendant but expanded it to include all
those financially unable to afford their own psychiatrist. Thus,
a defendant who may have sufficient funds to secure his own
attorney would not be denied the help of a psychiatrist on an
insanity defense merely because his funds are insufficient to
cover the cost of both attorney and expert.
The Act did not give the indigent defendant an unlimited
right to partisan psychiatric aid in each criminal proceeding.
79 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-48. Procedures to discover and dispose of
incompetents both before and during trial. RULE 28, FED.
R. CRvm. P. Procedure by which court may appoint expert
witness. RULE 17 (b), FED. R. Crmv. P. Procedure by which
power of subpoena is extended to indigent defendants.
80 See REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERA 's Comm. ON POVERTY AND
THE ADINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRniNAL JUsTIcE 6 (1963)
[often cited as ALLEN REPORT, a ft e r the chairman of
the committee Francis A. Allen]. For a discussion of fed-
eral procedures prior to the Act see Lewin, Mental Disorder
and the Federal Indigent, 11 S. DAK. L. REV. 198 (1966).
81 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
82 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (e) (1964):
Counsel for a defendant who is financially unable to ob-
tain investigative, expert, or other services necessary to an
adequate defense in his case may request them in an ex
parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry
in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary
and that the defendant is financially unable to obtain them,
the court shall authorize counsel to obtain the services.
[Vol. 7, No. 2
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The assignment of such psychiatric assistance was left to the
discretion of the district courts upon an ex parte showing of
necessity. 83 In Christian v. United States84 Judge Murrah held
that the court has a duty to provide such services when the
need is established.85 That this discretion should not be un-
duly restrictive is the holding of the court in United States
v. Schultz88 . The Schultz Court further held that the defendant
is entitled to a government paid independent psychiatrist even
where an impartial psychiatrist had already examined the
defendant, thus negating the sufficiency of the impartial ex-
pert.87
The Congress has recognized that the adversary procedure
requires that parties in a criminal proceeding have an equal
opportunity to prepare and conduct such proceedings with
the assistance of required experts such as psychiatrists.88
A number of states have enacted local statutes similar
to the Criminal Justice Act since 1964.89 The tendency in all
states has been to interpret narrowly the discretion granted
83 See e.g. Ramer v. United States, 390 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1968).
84 398 F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1968).
85 Id. at 519:
"Where the defendant satisfactorily establishes the need
for subsection (e) services the district court has a duty to
authorize such services for the proper preparation of the
defendant's case."
86 431 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1970).
87 Supra note 29.
88 Lewin, Mental Disorder and the Federal Indigent 11 S.
DAx. L. REv. 198, 250 (1966):
The scales of justice are balanced. The indigent de-
fendant in the federal process now has an oppor-
tunity to secure a psychiatric defense without re-
lying upon the chatity of the prosecution or upon
devices that either were in the nature of impartial
expert testimony or were weighted heavily in favor
of the prosecution.
89 See Annot, 18 A.L.R.3d 1074, 1091 (1968).
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to the courts in providing for the assistance of partisan psy-
chiatrists, or of other experts as authorized by the statutes
to indigent defendants. That the statutes exist at all is an
indication of the recognition of the public policy supporting
the need for equality of opportunity to prepare an effective
defense. That the statutes are narrowly construed is prob-
ably due to the lack of higher court decisions that such as-
sistance is a matter of constitutional right.
CONCLUSION
As the courts increase their reliance on the testimony
of psychiatrists where insanity is at issue, and as the com-
plexity of such defense increases, the indigent defendant and
his assigned counsel are placed at an increasing disadvantage
should they be lacking the aid of a psychiatrist. That a duty
exists for the government to provide the indigent with par-
tisan psychiatric assistance has been recognized by the Con-
gress and by the lower federal courts in recent years. Most
of the states, however, have not enacted specific legislation
providing the indigent defendant with the psychiatric aid
necessary to meet the constitutional guarantees.
These states have usually left it up to the local court to
formalize the rules and procedures under which the defendant
may be granted such expert assistance.
To ensure that such local rules will provide the sufficient
aid necessary, it is up to the Supreme Court to decide when
the due process right to counsel encompasses the furnishing
of government paid partisan psychiatric aid to the indigent.
Serge Novovich
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